
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RHODESIA

Tanzanian President Nyerere and Mozambican President Machel are seeking to tighten their control over outside aid to the Rhodesian nationalists, in part to limit non-African involvement with the guerrillas.

The presidents are also concerned that direct Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese aid to the rival factions of the nationalist African National Council could widen the existing divisions and weaken the insurgency against the Smith government.

Last week, the Tanzanian foreign minister called in the ambassadors of a number of communist countries, as well as some Western envoys, and said that all outside support for the nationalists was to be channeled through Tanzania and Mozambique by the African Liberation Committee of the OAU. According to the East Germans, the Tanzanians directed the communist countries to discontinue bilateral support for the various rival nationalist factions.

Nyerere and Machel agreed with Zambian President Kaunda and Botswanan President Khama at their recent meeting in Lusaka that no Cuban or other foreign combat troops would be allowed to join the fighting in Rhodesia. The four presidents are prepared to accept aid and training for the guerrillas from wherever it is available, but they are opposed to direct Soviet and Cuban involvement such as occurred in Angola.

The pressure on the Africans to allow gre	
increase if the fighting drags on with no end in si	ght. The four presidents reportedly
are looking for fairly rapid successes on the bat	tlefield, which seems unlikely. The
Zambians are said to be concerned that if the f	ighting does not go well, it will be
necessary to reconsider the use of foreign troops.	
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ALGERIA-MOROCCO

Algeria is making a fresh attempt to keep its dispute with Morocco over Western Sahara alive at the UN.

A senior Algerian Foreign Ministry official, in a recent conversation with the US ambassador in Algiers, said the return to the area last week of UN Secretary General Waldheim's special envoy demonstrated that the international community was still involved in the Sahara problem. He urged the US to "encourage" UN efforts to resolve the dispute. He failed to break any new ground on the substance of the dispute, however, avoiding mention of any possible areas for compromise.

The official claimed Algiers welcomed all attempts at mediation, even from countries such as Senegal that have supported Morocco in the dispute. Senegalese Foreign Minister Seck visited Nouakchott, Algiers, and Rabat last week. The Senegalese ambassador in Algiers described the visit as merely an exploratory mission, but he said Seck was encouraged by Algeria's apparent interest in a dialogue on the Sahara question. Senegalese President Senghor has offered to mediate the dispute.

Algiers probably is more interested in delaying international acceptance of the Moroccan-Mauritanian take-over of Western Sahara than it is in genuine mediation. The Algerians have not given any indication that they are willing to compromise, and they continue to support Polisario Front guerrillas seeking independence for the territory.

Meanwhile, Morocco and Mauritania have refused to receive Waldheim's special envoy. The envoy visited Algiers from March 30 to April 2, meeting with Polisario representatives and inspecting Saharan refugee camps in southwestern Algeria. On April 4, Rabat and Nouakchott cabled Waldheim that because the envoy had exceeded his mandate he no longer had any authority to complete his mission.

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SPAIN

The decision of two major Christian Democratic groups to endorse the newly formed Spanish opposition front indicates that even the moderate left will challenge the government's ban on the Communist Party.

On Sunday, Ruiz Gimenez' Christian Democratic Left agreed to support the move of the Socialist-led Platform of Democratic Convergence to merge with the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta. More surprising was the decision by Gil Robles' Popular Democratic Federation to join the opposition front. The Gil Robles group is not a member of either the Platform or the Junta and was believed to oppose the formation of the front.

The Gil Robles faction's willingness to discard its previous rejection of cooperation with the Communists apparently stemmed from its desire to consummate the long-discussed merger with the Christian Democratic Left. At their separate congresses over the weekend, the two factions agreed to unite and pledged to work toward cooperation between all Christian Democratic groups in Spain.

Both Christian Democratic parties stipulated that their participation in the opposition front—the Democratic Coordination—depends on its renunciation of the use of violence. There has been no indication so far whether the front will accept this proviso.

The endorsement of the new front by the Christian Democrats suggests that the government has failed to isolate the Communist Party. The government has taken a tough line with the front, denouncing it as Communist-dominated, but so far has limited prosecution to the most leftist and extremist groups in the alliance.

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PORTUGAL

An upsurge in political violence in Portugal over the weekend, coinciding with the opening of the official campaign period, could prompt military leaders to take stronger actions to ensure that the legislative election will be held peacefully on April 25.

The military has vowed to use force if necessary to maintain order during the campaign. A new 400-man paramilitary intervention force has been formed to deal with unlawful demonstrations in the Lisbon area. Outside of Lisbon, the commander of the central military region has scheduled air and ground maneuvers to begin tomorrow, apparently in the belief that a show of force will help quiet the situation.

To discourage media abuse, the Revolutionary Council has empowered the National Electoral Commission to suspend political broadcasts by any party seeking to use its allotted time to incite disorder.

Despite the military's precautions and tough words, violence is likely to continue or even increase. In the north, extremists may seek to avenge the bombing death of a leftist politician last Saturday. Revolutionary Council member Pinho Freire believes sporadic violence will continue in the south, where the government has been unable or unwilling to take hard decisions on returning illegally expropriated lands to their rightful owners.

A meeting of the Portuguese Confederation of Farmers in southeastern Portugal to protest land reform legislation was broken up on Sunday by leftist farm workers who are opposed to any backtracking on agrarian reform. The conservative farmers had issued an ultimatum to the government demanding that it begin restoring seized lands by April 5, but apparently this deadline will slip, as has been the case twice before.

Meanwhile, the last remaining legal impediment to the legislative assembly election was removed with the promulgation of the new Portuguese constitution last Friday. The document, which will come into force on April 25, presents a mixture of Marxist and more conservative ideals, reflecting the political changes during the 10 months the constituent assembly was in session.


Those sections of the constitution dealing with the economy will probably be the first to be disputed by the legislative assembly, to be elected on April 25. The constitution declares that the Portuguese economy will be organized along socialist lines through the collective appropriation of the principal means of production and the implementation of an agrarian reform program. Past nationalizations may not be rescinded.

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The groundwork for an early challenge to these provisions was laid when the Social Democratic Center voted against the final document. The party did, however, agree to abide by the new constitution and seek recourse through legal channels.

Conservatives will no doubt be better represented in the new legislature than
they were in the constituent assembly, but the Socialists and Communists
anticipated this shift and have erected barriers to any effort to undo their work. A
compromise was reached permitting the legislative assembly to amend the
constitution, but certain major constitutional principles must remain on the books
until a second legislature is elected in four years.

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PANAMA

UN Representative Aquilino Boyd has replaced Juan Tack as foreign minister. Tack was temporarily removed from the position in June 1975 to concentrate on his primary job as chief canal treaty negotiator. There are also indications Boyd will replace Tack as head of Panama's treaty team. The change is not expected to alter Panama's treaty stance or relations with the US.

Boyd had been foreign minister from 1956 to 1958 and permanent UN representative since April 1962. He has long been the government's top adviser on UN affairs. While frank and cooperative with US representatives at the UN on some issues, he has consistently assumed a hard-line, ultranationalist stance on treaty negotiations, taking advantage of every opportunity to advance Panama's treaty stance from his UN post. He has on occasion been harshly critical of the US presence in the canal zone. In most instances, he has spoken with the full knowledge and authority of Chief of Government Torrijos.

The Panamanian government has given assurances Boyd's assignment does not represent a shift in orientation. In his new posts, Boyd, like Tack, will closely reflect Torrijos' thinking. Should relations with the US deteriorate, Boyd's talent at Washington-baiting will come into play.				

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PERU-USSR

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Since the USSR is the only country willing to provide high-performance aircraft for immediate delivery, and on generous long-term credit arrangements, Lima reportedly may purchase as many as 25 to 50 of these fighters.

Although the air force's leadership would prefer the US A-4M Skyhawk, Washington has so far offered only F-5 interceptors. The UK has made a vague offer to sell the Jaguar tactical jet fighter, a jointly produced British-French aircraft.

The Peruvian air force has sought modern aircraft to replace its antiquated combat aircraft inventory, especially its F-86 and Hawker Hunter fighters. Lima is not interested in further French Mirage purchases because it has had continuing spare parts and maintenance problems with its French supplier. It also faced unexpected add-on charges for the three squadrons of Mirage IIIs and 5s it purchased since 1967.

Peru's army has received about \$85 million of Soviet ground equipment and helicopters from the USSR since 1973. Peru has increased the number of Soviet advisers and maintenance personnel in the country from 15 in late 1973 to at least 35 in 1975. An order for Soviet aircraft would raise that number to perhaps over 100 within a year of initial deliveries.

The Peruvian government will have to weigh purchasing the Soviet aircraft against the political implications of a deepening military relationship with Moscow. Lima is facing pressures from rightists in the military; some opposition within the air force already has surfaced. It must also consider the potential impact on Peru's neighbors, particularly Chile. The Andean countries are currently holding arms limitations talks.

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ANNEX

ISRAELI OPTIONS IF SYRIA MOVES INTO LEBANON

Lebanon's internal strife carries with it the risk of eventual Syrian intervention in force and an Israeli countermove that could lead to a general Arab-Israeli war.

An Israeli decision to intervene following the large-scale movement of Syrian forces into Lebanon would be based on whether Israel considered:

- -- The movement as a direct threat.
- -- Failure to act as damaging to Israel's credibility.
- --The situation in southern Lebanon as constituting a vacuum that could be filled by elements hostile to Israel unless preventive action were taken.

While rapid intervention based on such considerations cannot be entirely ruled out, a more cautious approach by Israel appears more likely.

Any decision to intervene would be made only after a careful assessment of the situation and potential consequences. Intervention carries the risk of a crisis in relations with the US, a degradation of relations with other countries, the definite possibility of sparking a general Arab-Israeli conflict, and the economic dislocation associated with the large-scale mobilization necessary for both intervention and reinforcement of the Golan front. The most important of these is probably the risk of a crisis with the US while Tel Aviv faced a generalized war. Israel regards its relationship with the US as crucial to its security.

Israeli intervention in Lebanon would be likely to close Arab ranks behind Syria, something that Syria has not been able to accomplish and Israel has actively sought to avoid. While Israel is confident in its ability to defeat Syria, many Israelis would be reluctant to risk a war unless Israel's security were truly threatened.

The economic costs of mobilization involving more than 100,000 reserve personnel would probably not be decisive by themselves in determining the decision.

Israeli leaders have not given a clear picture of what would cause Israel to move its forces into Lebanon. They have indicated, however, that Israel would not intervene unless a threat to the security of its northern border developed. We believe the movement of regular Syrian forces into southern Lebanon and/or the buildup of significant Palestinian or radical Lebanese Muslim forces south of the Litani River would constitute such a threat. The large-scale movement of Syrian regular forces into Lebanon for whatever purpose could also provoke an Israeli countermove.

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Israeli objectives in intervening would be primarily military and would be determined by the immediacy of the threat. A buildup of hostile forces in the border area would almost certainly elicit combined air-ground operations to destroy the enemy units involved or drive them north of the Litani River line. Should Israel conclude that Syrian forces intended to or were in fact moving into southern Lebanon, an attempt would probably be made to occupy temporarily the Litani crossings and create a buffer zone between the river and the border.

Israel could be expected to retain a sizable portion of Lebanese territory for as long as Israeli security planners see fit. There will be domestic pressures to remain once in place, but significant diplomatic and internal economic pressures would act to limit it. Israel might also use its presence as a bargaining chip in an attempt to obtain both Syrian withdrawal and Syrian and Lebanese assurances of a quiet border. No attempt to occupy all of Lebanon is expected.

The Northern Command, headquartered at Nazareth, has enough forces, except airmobile, to accomplish Israeli objectives in a move into Lebanon and simultaneously to reinforce the Golan front.

Full mobilization of the Northern Command, including reserves, would provide a force of three armored divisions, two mechanized infantry brigades, and three infantry brigades, with 45,000 to 50,000 troops in combat units, and 900 to 1,000 tanks. At least one airborne brigade from General Headquarters probably would be used as part of the intervention force. It is estimated that combat units of such a brigade could be deployed to the Litani River in about six hours. Selected units from other commands would be activated, and a high state of alert called throughout the services.

Israeli intervention will most likely be carried because of the inherent risks of such a major venture	er a direct threat,	25X1
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